
In my previous post, I explored Julian Jaynes’ bicameral mind hypothesis on its own terms. Taken seriously, it offers a strikingly coherent picture: ancient humans did not experience their thoughts as their own, but as the voices of gods. Seen through that lens, a wide range of otherwise puzzling features of ancient literature fall neatly into place. Divine commands, the absence of introspection, and the suspicion of acting “on one’s own” all begin to look less like metaphor and more like a fundamentally different way of experiencing thought.
That explanatory power is precisely what makes the hypothesis so attractive. But it is also a reason for caution. A theory that seems to explain everything risks explaining too much. Once adopted, it becomes easy to reinterpret any piece of evidence — any text, silence, or ambiguity — as confirmation. In that sense, it bears a resemblance to the ancient aliens “theory”, where the framework is so flexible that it becomes difficult to falsify.
Continue reading “Genius or rubbish? Jaynes revisited”






